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The Value of Knowledge 
Why is it better to know something rather than nothing? Perhaps because 
knowledge is an end in itself. But we also seek knowledge in order to make in-
formed decisions. Informed decisions, we believe, are better than uninformed 
ones. What is the relevant sense of"better" and what basis is there for the belief? 
There is a Bayesian answer to these questions. It is that coherence requires you 
to believe in the value of knowledge. 
It is a theorem in the context of the decision theory ofL. J. Savage (1954) and 
a standard treatment of learning by conditionalization that the prior expected util-
ity of making an informed decision is always at least as great as that of making 
an uninformed decision, and is strictly greater if there is any probability that the 
information may affect the decision. The proof is stated in a characteristically 
trenchant note by I. J. Good (1967). 
This paper will investigate the extent to which this account can be generalized 
to various models of the acquisition of information and to variant theories of ex-
pected utility, its import for the theory of deliberation, and its connection with 
payoff in the long run. 
I. Good Thinking 
Suppose that one can either choose between n acts, Ai, . . . ,An now or per-
form a cost-free experiment, E, with possible results [ek] and then decide. The 
value of choosing now is the expected value of the act with the greatest expected 
utility (the prior Bayes act): 
MAXj :Ei Pr(Ki) U(Aj & Ki) 
MAXj :Ek :Ei Pr(Ki) Pr(ek!Ki) U(Aj & Ki). 
The value of making an informed decision conditional on experimental result e 
is the expected utility conditional one of the act that has the highest expected util-
ity after assimilating the information e (the posterior Bayes act associated withe): 
MAXj :Ei Pr(Kd e) U(Aj & Ki). 
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The present value of making an informed decision is the expectation: 
Lk Pr(ek) MAXi Li Pr(Ki) ek) U(Ai & Ki) 
Lk Pr(ek) MAXi Li Pr(ek\Ki) Pr(Ki)/Pr(ek) U(Ai & Ki) 
(by Bayes's Theorem) 
Lk MAXi Li Pr(ek I Ki) Pr(Ki) U(Ai & Ki). 
The formulas for the present value of making an informed decision and an unin-
formed decision differ only in the order of the first two operations. But it is true 
on general mathematical grounds that Lk MAXi g(k,j) is greater than or equal to 
MAXi Lk g(k,j), with strict inequality if MAXi g(k,j) is not the same for all k, 
q.e.d. 
The situation is easy to visualize when there are only two possible experimen-
tal results: ei ,e2. Suppose that there are three possible acts: Ai ,A2,A3, whose ex-
pected utility is graphed as a function of Pr( ez) in figure 1. 
If the experiment is performed and ez is the result, then Pr(e2) will equal 1, 
and Ai will have the greatest expected utility. If the experiment is performed and 
ei is the result, then Pr( ez) will equal zero and Az will be the optimal act. If prior 
to the experiment Pr(e2) = 1/3, then A3 will be the prior Bayes act. The expected 
utility of the prior Bayes act is thus the convex function indicated by the bold line 
in figure 2: 
The expected utility of an informed decision is plotted as the dotted line con-
necting the expected utility of Ai at Pr(e2) = 1 with the expected utility of A2 
at Pr(e2) = 0. The vertical difference between the bold and dotted lines is the net 
gain in prior expected utility resulting from the determination to make an in-
formed decision. This is zero only if both experimental outcomes lead to the same 
posterior Bayes act or if one is already certain of the experimental outcome; 
otherwise it is positive. 
I want to take explicit notice here of some of the features of the system within 
which the proof proceeds. In the first place the expected utility theory assumed 
is statistical decision theory as found in Savage (1954), where a distinction is 
made between states of the world, acts, and consequences; where states of the 
world together with acts determine the consequences; and where the relevant ex-
pectation is unconditional expected utility: 
Li Pr(Ki) U(A & Ki). 
We will see in section V that in the decision theory of Jeffrey (1965), where the 
value of an act goes by its conditional expected utility, Good's theorem fails. 
Secondly, by using the same notation for acts and states pre- and postexperi-
ment, we are assuming that performance of the experiment itself cannot affect the 
state in any relevant way and that, so far as they affect consequences, the generic 
acts available postexperiment are equivalent to those available preexperiment. 
This assumption is violated, for example, in an Abbott and Costello movie where 
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Figure 1. Expected Utility as a Function of Pr (ez). 
Costello is charged with keeping a match dry until a crucial time. Abbott keeps 
asking Costello ifthe match is dry and Costello keeps replying "Yes." Finally it 
is time to light the match. "Are you sure it's dry?" Abbott asks for the final time. 
"Yes, I lit it a little while ago to make sure," Costello replies. 
In the third place, the proof implicitly assumes not only that the decision maker 
is a Bayesian but also that he knows that he will act as one. The decision maker 
believes with probability one that if he performs the experiment he will (i) update 
by conditionalization and (ii) choose the posterior Bayes act. For an example 
where (i) fails, consider the case of the wrath of Khan. You are a prisoner of 
Khan, who (you firmly believe) is about to insert a mindworm into your brain, 
which will cause you to update by conditionalization on the denial of the ex-
perimental result. For an example where (ii) fails, consider the compulsive loser 
who conditionalizes correctly on the experimental result, but then proceeds to 
choose the act with minimum posterior expected utility. 
I am not taking issue here with any of the assumptions, but merely making 
them explicit. As it stands, the theorem is a beautifully lucid answer to a fun-





Figure 2. The Value of Information. 
damental epistemological question. It will be of some interest, however, to see 
to what extent the assumptions can be relaxed and the theorem retained. 
II. Probable Knowledge 
Does knowledge always come nicely packaged as a proposition in one's subjec-
tive probability space? To attempt an affirmative answer would be either to defend 
a form of "the myth of the given" of unprecedented strength, or to relapse into 
skepticism. But the standard Bayesian theory ofleaming from experience by con-
ditionalization and, in particular, the analysis of the last section appear to tacitly 
make just this assumption. This is not because Bayesians have been ignorant of 
the problem, but rather because it is much easier to raise the difficulty than to sug-
gest any constructive treatment. 
One positive suggestion put forward by Richard Jeffrey (1965, 1968) is to 
generalize Bayes's rule of conditionalization. Suppose that an observational inter-
action falls short of making proposition p certain, but makes it highly probable. 
Suppose also that the only effect on the observer's subjective probability space is 
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through the effect on p; i.e., the probabilities conditional on p and on its negation 
remain constant. Then we have what Jeffrey calls belief change by probability 
kinematics on the partition [p,-p]. Conditionalization on p and on its negation are 
extreme cases. Jeffrey extends the notion to any partition, all of whose members 
have positive probability in the obvious way. We have belief change by probabil-
ity kinematics on that partition, just in case posterior probabilities conditional on 
members of the partition (where defined) remain unchanged. 
Does the analysis of the last section extend to the case of probable knowledge? 
Paul Graves has recently shown that it does (Graves, forthcoming). Here is a 
sketch of Graves's analysis. 
Suppose that you can either choose now among n acts, or perform a cost-free 
experiment whose result will be a belief change by probability kinematics on par-
tition r. There may be no proposition in your language capturing just the 
phenomonological "feel" of the possible observational inputs. But are there enter-
tainable propositions that capture the possible effects on your probability space 
of the observational interaction? Well, you could just describe the possible final 
probability measures that could come about. There is no reason why you could 
not think about these possible outcomes now, expanding your probability space 
to allow final probability, prf,to enter as a random variable. 
You believe now that your observational interaction is a legitimate way of ac-
quiring information, and so you have now: 
(M) PR(q I prr=pr*) = pr*(q). 
You believe that your belief change will be by probability kinematics on partition 
r' so for any final probability pr*' any proposition q that is "first order" (i.e.' does 
not involve prr), and any member y of r, you have: 
(PK) pr*(q I y) = PR(q I y), 
from the definition of probability kinematics on r. By (M) this is equivalent to: 
(S) PR(qiprr=pr* & y) = PR(qly). 
Since we are sure that the belief change is by probability kinematics on r, it is 
sufficient, to specify the possible final probabilities, that we specify just the final 
probabilities of members of the partition thus: 
Ai prr(yi) = Cli, 
since only one final probability can meet this specification and come from the ini-
tial probability by probability kinematics on r. So (S) becomes: 
(M') PR(qlAiprr(Yi) = Cli&y) = PR(qly). 
Now the foregoing is all done in terms of what your present probabilities are 
about the way that your final probabilities will be after the ineffable observational 
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interaction, without speculation as to the nature of that interaction. Nevertheless, 
it implies that your probabilities are structured as if your experimental result con-
sisted in learning /\i prr(Yi) = ai, and conditionalizing on the result. Then Good's 
theorem goes through just as in the last section, with these sentences in place of 
the eks. 
Graves's treatment assumes for simplicity that the prior probabilities are con-
centrated on a finite number of possible combinations of posterior probabilities 
of members of the partition, but the analysis generalizes in a straightforward way 
to the continuous case. Consider belief change by probability kinematics on the 
partition [e1,e2] where the priQ{ for prf(e1) is given by a continuous probability 
density. Here we need to strengthen (M) to: 
(M +) PR[e1 I prr(e1)EI] El, 
where I is any closed interval such that PR[prr(e1)i::I] >0. An immediate conse-
quence of (M +) is the expectation principle: 
(E) PR (e1) = E [prr (e1)]. 
This together with the fact that the the expected utility of the Bayes act is a convex 
function of pr( ei) leads immediately to the Good theorem. Let 0 be the expected 
utility of the Bayes act. From the convexity of 0 it follows on general mathemati-
cal grounds (Jensen's inequality: Royden 1968, 110) that: 
E [0 {prr(e1)}] ~ 0 [E {prr(e1)}], 
so by (E): 
E [0 {prr(e1)] ~ 0[ PR(e1)]; 
but by (M +) and the theorem on total probability, the prior expectation of the 
expected utility of the posterior Bayes act is equal to the prior expected utility of 
the decision to make an informed decision, q.e.d. 
III. Ramsey's Anticipation 
Good makes no great claims of originality. He cites treatments of the value 
of evidence by Lindley (1965) and Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961) as partial anticipa-
tions. To this list one must surely add Savage himself, who discusses the value 
of observation and indeed proves a form of the Good theorem in Chapter 7 (and 
appendix 2) of The Foundations of Statistics (1954). It would not be suprising if 
one could trace the basic idea back a little further. But it is worth reporting that 
Frank Ramsey had it back in the 1920s. 
In two manuscript pages on "Weight or the Value of Knowledge," Ramsey (un-
published) sketches a version of the theorem. He proceeds in a rich setting where 
your act consists in choosing the values of a list, x1 ,x2, . . . ; of "control vari-





Figure 3. EU(x) Assuming a Maximum. 
ables." He supposes that there is an unknown proposition, a, such that the ex-
pected utility ofxi considered as a function ofxi [for a fixed value ofpr(a)] is con-
tinuous and twice differentiable and assumes its maximum at a nonextreme value 
of xi; so that at the maximum oEU(xi \ a)/Oxi = 0 with the second derivative nega-
tive. This situation is illustrated in figure 3. It is also assumed that different acts 
are optimal for pr(a)=l and pr(a)=O. 
In this context Ramsey considers a function, 0(p), which he calls the "expec-
tation of advantage in regard to a if I expect it with probability p." This is what 
we called in section 1 "the expected utility of the prior Bayes act." He argues that 
the second derivative of this function must be everywhere positive; i.e., that the 
function must be strictly convex. I reproduce as figure 4 Ramsey's own illustra-
tion of the situation. 1 It can be compared with the case of a finite number of acts 
shown in figure 2 of section 1. 
It follows immediately that the expected value of an experiment whose pos-
sible results are a, not-a is positive. If Ramsey had simply noted this, it would 
have been enough for the theorem. Instead, however, he did something much 
more interesting. He considered the case in which the experimental result was not 
the truth value of a, but the truth value of another proposition, k, whose only 
effect on expected utility of the acts is in its alteration of the probability of the 
252 Brian Skyrms 
Figure 4. Ramsey's Diagram. (Courtesy of the University of Pittsburgh). 
experiment. (In other words, probability of a conditional on the experimental re-
sult considered as a random variable is a sufficient statistic for the experiment.) 
In Ramsey's illustration, r is the probability of a conditional on k (together with 
background know ledge) and s is the probability of a conditional on the denial of 
k. As Ramsey notes, it is evident (from the strict convexity of 0) that the gain 
in expected utility associated with undertaking the experiment (the length of the 
line segment PQ) must be positive unless k is irrelevant to the probability of a, 
and p=r=s. This can be seen as a special case of the problem discussed in the 
last section, where we have belief change by probability kinematics on a, not-a 
with only two possible results. 
This is of special interest because we have other evidence that probability kine-
matical ideas were not foreign to Ramsey. There is a partial anticipation of proba-
bility kinematics in an 1851 paper by W.F. Donkin. Ramsey took a page ofnotes 
from this article. The manuscript is in the Pittsburgh archives. I quote Ramsey 
quoting Donkin: 
If there be any number of mutually exclusive hypotheses h1, h2, hJ -; of which 
the probabilities relative to a particular state of information are p1, p2, p3 -, 
and if new information is gained which changes the probabilities of some of 
them suppose of hm = t and all that follow, without having otherwise any refer-
ence to the rest, then the probabilities of these latter have the same ratios to 
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one another after the new information that they had before- . . . (Emphasis 
is Ramsey's.) 
IV. Dynamic Probability and Other Forms of 
Generalized Leaming 
Suppose that you are in an even more amorphous learning situation than the 
kind that motivates Jeffrey's ideas. There is no nontrivial partition that you expect 
with probability one to be sufficient for your belief change. Perhaps you are in 
a novel situation where you expect the unexpected observational input. Perhaps 
there is to be no external observational input, and you are in the realm of what 
Good calls "dynamic probability." You are just going to think about some subject 
matter and the input, if you are lucky enough to have one, will be the "aha erleb-
niss." How unstructured can the setting for belief change be while the Good the-
orem is retained? 
Reflection on section 2 suggests that the theorem does not really depend on any 
restrictions imposed by probability kinematics. After all, in the case of a discrete 
space where all the atoms have positive probability, any belief change is by proba-
bility kinematics on the partition of unit sets of the atoms. And the theorem did 
not depend on the belief change being by probability kinematics on any special 
partition. We do, however, need some form of principle M to assure you that you 
regard the upcoming belief-changing process as a learning experience. 
Consider the case in which there are a finite number of relevant states of the 
world and a finite number of acts. Let the states of the world be K1, ... Kn. 
The set of probability measures over these states can be represented as a k-1 
dimensional simplex ink dimensional Euclidian space. The expected utility of the 
Bayes act is a function of these probabilities. Now suppose that the you are about 
to undergo what you expect will be a learning experience in that your prior proba-
bilities satisfy an appropriate form of principle M: 
(M++): infPROB (q) ::S PR [qjprrs PROB] ::S supPROB (q), 
for any q, where PROB is any rectangle (hyperinterval) of probability measures, 
such that PR[prtEPROB] is positive. This is all we assume about the learning ex-
perience. M + + guarantees that: 
(E): PR = E [prr]. 
0 is still convex. By the appropriate form of Jensen's inequality (Loeve 1963, 
159): 
E [0(prr)] ~ 0 [E(prr)], 
and by (E): 
E [0(prr) ~ 0 [PR]. 
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The argument can be generalized under appropriate regularity conditions to 
cover infinite state spaces and infinite numbers of acts, but this involves some 
mathematical complications. 2 
Here is Good thinking reduced to its bare essentials. Nothing at all about the 
nature of the event that is to occasion your belief change has been specified, ex-
cepting your belief in the epistemological legitimacy of the impending belief 
change as embodied in (M). Bayesians have found it difficult to say anything in-
formative about belief revision situations with so little structure, but in the pres-
ence of higher-order probabilities and condition (M) Good's theorem emerges 
from the mists unscathed. 
V. Conflicting Expectations 
I noted at the onset that Good's theorem is proved in the context of a Savage-
type expected utility theory. The remark was not idle. In the variant form of ex-
pected utility theory best known to philosophers-that developed in Richard 
Jeffrey's Logic of Decision (1st ed.)-Good's theorem fails (Adams and 
Rosenkrantz 1980; Skyrms 1982). And for a number of forms of "causal decision 
theory" introduced by philosophers as alternatives to Jeffrey's theory, the question 
has not been adequately discussed (Skyrms 1982). 
In Jeffrey's (1965) theory, there is no distinction between states, acts, and con-
sequences. Probabilities and utilities are defined on a Boolean a-algebra of propo-
sitions, and what we might intuitively take to be states, acts, and consequences 
are represented as propositions. The expected value of a proposition, A, is a con-
ditional expected utility: 
(Jeffrey) V(A) = Li Pr(A!Bi) V(A & Bi), 
for any partition [Bi]. The probability in question is subjective degree-of-belief. 
Note, in particular, that A may have positive probabilistic relevance to B because 
A is evidence for B, rather than a causal factor favorable to B. For this reason 
we call the theory, which holds that the choice-worthiness of an act is measured 
by this conditional epistemic expected value, "evidential decision theory." Al-
though Jeffrey (1965) is, perhaps, the most thorough development of evidential 
decision theory, it is by no means the only endorsement of this type of theory. 
Evidential decision theory, in various forms, has a number of advocates. 
Jeffrey's theory has as a stated aim the elimination of the causal concepts im-
plicit in Ramsey's notion of a gamble and in Savage's distinction between acts, 
states, and consequences from the logic of decision. This gives rise to anomalous 
results in certain situations in which the act is symptomatic rather than causative. 
Newcomb's problem (see Nosick [1969]) is such a case. You have just taken 
a psychological examination that predicts fairly well how people behave in the 
impending decision situation. There are two boxes, one transparent and one 
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opaque. Your choice is either to take the opaque box and get whatever is under 
it, or to take both boxes (yes, both!) and get everything under the opaque box, 
together with $1,000, which is visible under the transparent box. The ex-
perimenter has put $1,000,000 under the opaque box ifher test predicted that you 
will take only it; nothing otherwise. The money is either there already or not, and 
you are convinced that there will be no cheating on the part of the experimenter. 
Your subjective probabilities that the experimenter will make the right prediction 
given that you take one box and given that you take both are both greater than 
.6. Taking one box is evidence that the million is there, but can in no way be a 
cause of its being there. A straightforward application of Jeffrey's theory leads 
to the recommendation that you take only the opaque box. 
In order to avoid such results, Robert Stalnaker (1972) suggested that the 
Jeffrey expectation be modified by replacing the conditional probability with the 
probability of a subjunctive conditional. This idea was systematically developed 
by Gibbard and Harper (1980), who define expected utility of an act, A, as: 
(SGH) L; Pr [If I were to do A, then O;] D(O;), 
where [O;] is a partition of ultimate consequences and D is desirability. 
The Stalnaker-Gibbard-Harper theory is, like that of Savage, made for condi-
tions of determinism, for it is assumed that the subjunctive conditionals involved 
themselves form a partition. David Lewis (1980) suggested an extension of Stal-
naker's approach to indeterministic situations by replacing the probability of the 
conditional with the expectation of the value of chance in a conditional with 
chance consequent: 
(Lewis) Lij Xj Pr [If I were to do A, CHANCE (0;) = Xj] V(O;). 
I sought the same generality in an extension of the Savage approach to condi-
tions of indeterminism. My proposal was to take expected utility as: 
(Skyrms) U(A) = Lij Pr(K;) Pr(Cj I A & K;) U(Cj & K; & A), 
where [K;] is a partition of states interpreted as causal preconditions of the deci-
sion, [Ci] is a partition of consequences, and A is the act. The foregoing three 
proposals go by the (possibly misleading) name "causal decision theory." 
Now Good's theorem fails for evidential decision theory. We can use a varia-
tion on Newcomb's problem to make the point. Suppose the experimenter offers 
you a peek under the opaque box before you make your decision, but cautions 
you that the accuracy of prediction holds up for subjects who are offered this op-
tion. An evidential decision theorist will presumably refuse the offer, reasoning 
that whatever he sees, he will subsequently take both boxes (on evidential the-
oretic grounds), which will be bad news (i.e., evidence that there is nothing under 
the opaque box). 
What is the status of Good's theorem in causal decision theory? The answer 
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is simplest with respect to the Stalnaker-Gibbard-Harper theory, for that theory 
can be viewed as a reformulation of the theory of Savage. In Savage's theory, the 
act together with the state determine the consequence, so that Savage can repre-
sent acts as random variables on the space of states. We can use the Savage frame-
work to give a semantics for the subjunctive conditionals that occur in the 
Gibbard-Harper account. The conditional: "If I were to do A, consequence C 
would follow," is true in a state just in case the act A maps that state onto conse-
quence C. The set of states in which such a subjunctive conditional is true is the 
inverse image of the consequence C under the function A. Conversely, given the 
Gibbard-Harper account, one can reconstruct Savage-type states as appropriate 
bundles of subjunctive conditionals. These remarks fall somewhat short of show-
ing that the theories are fully intertranslatable, but are sufficient for our purposes. 
The Stalnaker-Gibbard-Harper theory automatically inherits Good's theorem 
from its Savage counterpart. 
What about the more general indeterministic forms of causal decision pro-
posed by Lewis and myself? Here again we have one question rather than two, 
for a relation holds between our respective proposals analogous to that between 
Savage and Stalnaker-Gibbard-Harper. A state of the world, K, makes the sub-
junctive conditional "lfl were to do A, CHANCE (C) = x," true just in case Pr 
[CIA & KJ = x. 
It will suffice then, to discuss one of the proposals. I choose my own. The ex-
pected utility of A therein: 
I:ij Pr(Ki) Pr(CjlA & Ki) U(Cj & A & Ki), 
can be thought of as an expansion of Savage's: 
I:i Pr(Ki) U(A & Ki), 
wherein Savage's U(A & Ki) is analyzed as: 
I:j Pr(CjlA & Ki) U(Cj & A & Ki). 
Accordingly, Good's theorem extends to this case provided that this quantity is 
independent of each experimental result. A sufficient condition for this is that we 
have both the following: 
(I) U(Cj & A & Ki & ek) = U(Cj & A & Ki) for all i,j,k. 
(II) Pr(Cj I A & Ki & ~) = Pr(Cj I A & Ki) for all i,j,k. 
(I) is one precise way of saying in this context that information is really free. (II) 
may be thought of as saying that all the experimental results do is give you infor-
mation about the state of the world. They do not affect your belief about the condi-
tional chance of a consequence on an act obtaining in a given state of the world. 
Given the intended interpretation where [Ki] is a sufficient partition for condi-
tional chance of consequence on act, and thus state together with act determine 
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chance of consequence, condition (II) will be fulfilled if the theory has been 
properly applied. Good's theorem holds for the most general form of causal deci-
sion theory. 
VI. Deliberational Equilibrium and Rational Decision 
The dominant rationality concept in Bayesian decision theory is maximization 
of expected utility. The dominant rationality concept in the theory of games is 
equilibrium. The equilibrium concept has been absent from most discussions of 
the philosophical foundations of decision theory because those discussions have 
neglected aspects of the process of deliberation. 
In the simplest cases, the dynamics of deliberation may be trivial. One calcu-
lates expected utilities and maximizes. But there are more complex cases in which 
the very process of deliberation can generate new information relevant to the 
evaluation of the expected utilities at issue. In such cases, an act may have highest 
expected utility in terms of the probabilities available at the onset of deliberation, 
but look worse than other alternatives if we feed in the information that it is the 
act about to be chosen. 
Such cases have moved toward center stage in the philosophical discussions 
of the respective merits of evidential and causal decision theory. To deal with 
them, apologists for both theories have suggested that some sort of equilibrium 
condition be added to the principle of maximum expected utility in the account 
of individual rational decision. 
Richard Jeffrey and Ellery Eells explore the possibility that the class of 
equilibrium decisions under evidential decision theory may not include the anom-
alous cases that embarrass the theory. The idea is that the extra information 
generated by deliberation leading to a decision would screen off the spurious 
correlation between act and state of the world. And William Harper, responding 
to problems raised by Reed Richter, suggests that causal decision theory needs 
to be supplemented by an _equilibrium requirement. Harper, following Jeffrey, 
calls this a requirement of "ratifiability." 
The foregoing discussion of the value of knowledge in causal and evidential 
decision theory suggests the following two propositions: 
(I) The addition of an equilibrium requirement is inconsistent with the ex-
pected utility principle in evidential decision theory. 
(II) The equilibrium condition, in so far as it is legitimate, follows from the 
expected utility principle in causal decision theory. 
I will discuss them in order. 
If a decision maker finds himself about to make an equilibrium decision, there 
is no problem of consistency between the equilibrium condition and the expected 
utility hypothesis. But suppose that the act he has calculated to have maximum 
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expected utility will not retain maximum expected utility if the information that 
he is about do it is used to update his probabilities. The "ratifiability" defense of 
evidential decision claims that the evidential decision theorist who has just 
selected "take one box" as the Bayes act is in this position; that were he to update 
and recalculate at the moment of truth he would regret not taking two boxes. Let 
us suppose for the sake of argument that a case can be made out for the dubious 
claim that the additional information will so render act and state independent. The 
question still remains as to whether the decision maker should update and recalcu-
late. This is a question of the value of knowledge, and we have seen that even 
in the ideal case in which the evidential decision maker is offered a free knowl-
edge of the state of nature the theory may lead him to reject that offer. That is, 
the evidential decision theorist may associate negative expected utility with a 
policy of moving to an equilibrium decision. 
In causal decision theory, on the other hand, the general validity of Good's the-
orem suggests that in the absence of substansial processing costs, one should as-
similate whatever information is generated by the process of deliberation. 
Deliberation then becomes a dynamic process of moving towards the apparent op-
timal act under conditions of informational feedback. In such a decision process, 
a decision maker cannot choose a nonequilibrium act. As he gets close to choos-
ing the act, informational feedback will make it appear less than maximally attrac-
tive, and will point his deliberation in a different direction. In causal decision the-
ory, a policy of selecting an equilibrium decision is almost a consequence of the 
expected utility principle. 
Why almost? Well, in the first place there are real-world costs of computation 
that might be significant. But even if we idealize away these costs, there is a kind 
of fallacy of composition involved in assuming that one can justify a strategy of 
informational feedback by induction on the application of the Good theorem. 
Consider an artificial paradoxical situation in which there is always free informa-
tion available, and the decision as to which act to perform could be postponed 
for any finite time. Under a strategy of always assimilating free information, the 
decision maker would never act! When the strategy as a whole is evaluated against 
"Choose the prior Bayes act," we have seen that the conditions of the theorem are 
violated. There is no choice of a posterior Bayes act subsequent to the delibera-
tional process. Such a deliberational strategy is not Good thinking. 
A correct Bayesian treatment of deliberation must evaluate deliberational 
strategies as wholes. The question of optimum deliberational strategies for prob-
lems of the kind we have been discussing is a large and complex question, which 
I will not address in any detail here. A few qualitative points can, however, be 
made on the basis of the foregoing discussion. 
Suppose that you are confronted with two opaque boxes, A and B, and are to 
choose one and receive its contents. A mean demon, who you believe is a good 
predictor of your behavior conditional on either choice, has put money under the 
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box she predicted you won't choose. Let's say $1,000 if it is A and & 1, 100 if 
B, to make it interesting. Suppose you initially incline towards B, but when about 
to take B, you recalculate and find that A is more appealing; but when about to 
take B, you find A more appealing; etc. You find your deliberations oscillating, 
with convergence-if any-towards indecision rather than decision. You are 
suffering from Richter's complaint (Richter 1984). Richter's theory of its etiology 
is that there is something wrong with causal decision theory. Sharvy (1983) and 
Harper (1986) reply that you should consider mixed decisions, which do indeed 
include an equilibrium decision. Richter turns the screw. Randomization costs 
something. In fact, let's say that the reason that this is a mean demon is that she 
will boil you in oil if she catches you using a nondegenerate mixed strategy. 
In this case I would say that the cause of Richter's complaint is not a defect 
in causal decision theory, but rather a misapplication of Good's theorem. The ini-
tial choice is not between "Decide now between A and B," and "Deliberate, gener-
ate free information, and then face essentially the same choice situation." Rather, 
if we take the story at face value, it is between the former and "Deliberate, choose 
A, B, or a mixed strategy; or fail to make any choice." If this is the only other 
sort of deliberational strategy open to you, and you assign any positive probability 
to deliberation's getting you into the kind of trouble described, causal decision 
theory can recommend "Decide now between A and B," in accord with Richter's 
intuition. 
The sort of pathology to which Richter calls our attention is not simply the lack 
of an equilibrium decision, as is shown in the following example (Skyrms 1984, 
83): 
You are to choose one of three shells [A1,A2,A3], and will receive what is un-
der it. No mixed acts are allowed. (If you attempt to randomize, even men-
tally, the attempt will be detected and you will be shot.) A very good predictor 
has predicted your choice. If he predicted A1 , he put 10 cents under shell one 
and nothing under the others. If he predicted Az, he put $10 under shell two 
and $100 under shell three. If he predicted A3, he put $20 under shell three 
and $200 under shell two. 
Suppose you start deliberation with a very small probability of choosing A1 and 
equal probabilities of choosing Az and A3. If you deliberate continuously, moving 
towards maximum expected utility with informational feedback, you will suffer 
from Richter's complaint, hanging up between A2 and A3. Supposing that if you 
can't come to a decision, you get nothing, the expected utility of choosing the 
prior Bayes act is higher than that of the deliberational strategy that cannot lead 
to a decision. 
The example was designed to show something else as well. Suppose that you 
also have another deliberational strategy under consideration: "Choose the 
equilibrium decision with highest prior expected utility" (Harper 1984). There is 
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a unique equilibrium decision here, but the conditions for the Good theorem fail 
as before. 
What can we say about the conditions under which the Good theorem will ap-
ply to a deliberational strategy? In the first place, the process as a whole must be 
cost free. If it is possible that the process does not lead to any decision, then there 
is an associated cost equal to the difference in payoff of the prior Bayes act and 
of no decision. For the process as a whole to be cost free, the expected costs of 
no decision must be zero. (This may happen because a deliberational strategy has 
prior probability zero of leading to no decision, even though it may possibly lead 
to no decision.) Otherwise the costs of deliberation by that strategy must be 
balanced against its benefits. (One way of guaranteeing a decision is to adopt a 
strategy with a time limit, such that if no pure act has been selected by the time 
limit, the mixed act corresponding to the decision maker's state of indecision 
about pure acts will be selected as a default.) 
In the second place, the deliberational strategy as a whole must satisfy condi-
tion (M). Thus, for any fixed act, its initial expected utility must be equal to the 
initial expectation of its final expected utility. This can be thought of as a condi-
tion that the deliberational strategy be unbiased. One cannot, for instance, get 
away with a deliberational strategy designed to generate good news. And for 
deliberation to be nontrivial, one must be uncertain about where deliberation will 
lead. Since initial probability is the initial expectation of final probability, we 
have: 
If Pri[prr(p)=a] = 1, then Pri(P) = a. 
If you know where you're going, you're already there. Thus to the extent that 
deliberation generates information by computation, the results of computation 
must be initially uncertain. 
Condition (M) can also give us some guidance regarding the internal structure 
of a deliberational strategy. Consider the deliberational strategy that computes 
expected utility; assigns probability one to the act with maximum expected utility 
(provided there is a unique one); revises probabilities of states of nature accord-
ingly; and recomputes, etc. In the mean-demon case, this strategy oscillates be-
tween assigning probability one to box A and probability one to box B. From the 
point of view of automatic control, some damping in the system would be desir-
able. Condition (M) provides a less ad hoc justification. Applying it now to stages 
of deliberation we have: 
If Pr;[p] = 1 then Pri[prr(p) < l] = 0 
or, by contraposition, if you think that you may change your mind, you're not cer-
tain. A strategy that expects informational feedback that may with some positive 
probability alter the Bayes act, and that proceeds stagewise in accordance with 
(M), will not leap immediately to the assignment of probability one to the prior 
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Bayes act, but will rather move some distance in the direction of attractive op-
tions. Very simple models of this kind show suprisingly nice properties of conver-
gence to equilibrium decisions. (E.g., the Nash dynamics discussed in Skyrms 
[1986] "Deliberational Equilibria.") 
Questions of deliberational dynamics become more interesting in game-
theoretic contexts in which Bayesian players who know each other's initial start-
ing points deliberate, while attempting to second-guess each other's deliberations. 
In such contexts, informational feedback may be more interesting than in ex-
amples like the mean demon, and individual deliberational equilibriums may be 
related to game theoretic equilibriums. Rational deliberation may lead Bayesian 
players from an initial position to a unique game-theoretic equilibrium solution 
in non-zero sum games with multiple equilibriums. In this way, deliberational dy-
namics is related to the "tracing procedure" of Harsanyi and Selten (Harsanyi 
1975). Detailed discussion of these questions is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but perhaps enough has been said to show that considerations of the value of infor-
mation must play a foundational role in the theory of deliberation. 
VII. Condition M 
The analysis of generalized Good thinking shows that condition Mis of central 
importance. Fulfillment of condition M shows that you regard any impending be-
lief change as a generalized learning experience. This applies even when the ex-
perience cannot be neatly summarized as being given a proposition in your proba-
bility space. Consider the example of Ulysses and the sirens. Prior to the 
encounter with the sirens, Ulysses has initial probabilities, Pr, about what his 
probabilities will be after hearing the siren song. The possible sensory siren in-
puts cannot be easily summarized as propositions in his probability space. 
Ulysses believes that the sirens have the power and predilection to cloud men's 
minds so that they cease to believe that the rocks are dangerous (R). Condition 
M fails: 
Pr(Rlprr(R) < .1) > .1, 
and Ulysses believes that this sort of input can get him in deep trouble. Prudently, 
he makes arrangements (i) to prevent the input, and (ii) to prevent himself from 
acting effectively if (i) fails. 
In the setting of the original Good theorem, condition M holds automatically. 
Since the learning experience consists of conditionalizing on the experimental re-
sult, ek, final probability after the learning experience as a random variable in the 
initial probability space is identical to probability conditional on the partition of 
possible experimental results: 
prr (•) = Pr[•il{ek}], 
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which is a point function that takes as its value the ordinary conditional probabil-
ity Pr[• I e] for the member of the partition, e, that includes the point. But condi-
tion M holds by definition for probability conditional on a partition. Conversely, 
in the "dynamic probability" setting, with a finite number of possible prrs, we ex-
pand the initial small probability space by taking its product with space generated 
by taking the possible prrs as atoms. In the larger space, we have the partition 
of possible final probabilities (each of which, we are assuming, has positive prior 
probability). Condition M is necessary and sufficient for the final probability as 
a random variable to be equal to probability conditional on this partition. M is 
the principle that relates final probability to conditional probability. 
M is a principle of dynamic coherence. An agent's degrees of belief are stati-
cally coherent at a time in the weak sense if it is impossible to make a "Dutch 
book" against him in a finite number of bets that he regards at that time as fair 
or favorable, such that he suffers a net loss in every possible outcome. An agent's 
degrees of belief are statically coherent in the strong sense if it is impossible to 
make a Dutch book against him using bets all of which he considers favorable 
(or, equivalently, assuming payoffs are real valued, using a countable number of 
bets that he considers fair or favorable). Static coherence in the strong sense re-
quires the agent's degrees of belief to be a countably additive probability measure 
(Adams 1962), and we make this strong assumption in this paper. An agent is dy-
namically coherent (in strong and weak senses) if a Dutch book cannot be made 
against him by betting at different times, the bettor at the time of betting knowing 
no more than the agent does. (Goldstein 1983; Skyrms forthcoming a,b; Van 
Fraassen 1984). 
An agent has probabilities now about her probabilities tomorrow. Consider the 
simple case in which there are only a finite number of probabilities that she may 
have tomorrow, each of which today has finite positive probability. We assume 
that tomorrow the agent will know her own mind: Prr (prr=Prr) = 1, so con-
troversial features of higher order probability do not come into play. If we give 
the epistemic situation only this much structure, what can we say about dynamic 
coherence? 
A necessary and sufficient condition for dynamic coherence is that the agent's 
initial probability, Pr;, satisfy: 
(M) PR(q I prr=pr* = pr*(q). 
Necessity is established directly by describing a betting strategy that, by a finite 
number of bets today and tomorrow, can make a Dutch book against any agent 
who violates M (as in Goldstein 1983; or Van Fraassen 1984). Sufficiency is es-
sential because the random variable prr can be construed as probability condi-
tional on a partition. Any payoff function that the bettor can attain by betting at 
ti today and then tomorrow, if prr in some set S, can be attained by betting only 
at ti utilizing bets conditional on S (where S is a disjunction of a finite number 
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ofpr2s). (Something similar can again be said with regard to more general ver-
sions of M. See Goldstein [1983]; Gaifman [1986]; Skyrms [forthcoming a]). 
M is a condition for convergence. 3 Consider an infinite sequence of learning 
situations at time ti.ti, ... and a corresponding sequence of probabilities 
pr1,pr2, ... that indicate respectively the upshot of these learning situations. 
The situations might, for instance, be observations of outcomes of flips of a coin 
with unknown bias with updating by conditionalization. Prior to the sequence, we 
suppose that you have a big probability space on which pr1,pr2, ... are ran-
dom variables. Suppose also that you have the appropriate version ofM to assure 
the expectation principle: 
E [prn+ 1 II pr1, ... prn] = prn. 
(In our example, the random variable consisting of the expected value of proba-
bility of heads after observing n + 1 tosses, conditional on the probabalities after 
observing the first n tosses, is identical to the probability after observing n tosses 
considered as a random variable.) Then the sequence of upcoming revised proba-
bilities as random variables, pr1,pr2, ... forms a nonnegative martingale. 
Then with probability one, the sequence pri,pr2, ... converges to a random 
variable prff with: 
E [prff] = E [prt] = PR 
The random variable, prff, is final probability in the light of the whole learning 
sequence. In our example, prrr is a reasonable facsimile of ''the true chance that 
the coin comes up heads." Your initial probability of heads, PR(H), is equal to 
your initial expectation of the true chance of heads, E [prff(H)]. The example 
generalizes (see Dynkin 1978; Diaconis and Freedman 1981). Almost everything 
we know about convergence to a limiting relative frequency- the strong law of 
large numbers, de Finetti's theorem, and generalizations of de Finetti's theorem 
for various versions of partial exchangeability-are special cases of this martin-
gale convergence argument. 
Returning to the theme of this paper, what can we say about the value of 
knowledge in the long run? Suppose that learning experiences were really free 
in terms of time and opportunity costs, so that one could undertake an infinite 
number of learning experiences in a finite time, and then make a decision. By the 
martingale convergence theorem, the same argument used in section 4 for prr, 
goes through here for prrr, establishing in a general way the value of making a 
most informed decision. 4 
Notes 
1. I would like to thank the Ramsey family and the Archives for Logical Positivism at the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh for permission to reproduce this figure. 
2. The general case is treated in my "On the Principle of Total Evidence with and without Observa-
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tion and Sentences," in Logic, Philosophy of Science and Epistemology, Proceedings of the 11th Inter-
national Wittgenstein Symposium (Holder-Pichler-Tempsky: Vienna, 1987). 
3. The following argument assumes countable additivity. 
4. Research partially supported by NSF grant SES-8605122. 
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